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Statutory Damages Under the
Copyright Act of 1976
INTRODUCTION
Statutory damages have long been a feature of United States
copyright laws.1 Three of the early state copyright statutes prescribed fixed damages for infringement, 2 and the first federal
4
copyright law, enacted in 1790, 3 also provided such a remedy.
Despite its long history, this legislative measure of recovery in
copyright infringement suits has generated numerous problems.
The statutory damages provision 5 of the Copyright Act of 1909

1. Statutory damages are, in fact, unique to American copyright law. Claims for
damages in civil actions in other countries are generally limited to the copyright owner's
actual damages and/or the infringer's profits. Some foreign laws, however, prescribe
minimum and maximum amounts for such damages. Many foreign laws also provide for
punitive damages, the amounts of which depend on the defendant's intent to infringe.
For a general discussion of the damages provisions of various foreign copyright laws, see
Strauss, The Damage Provisionsof the Copyright Law, Copyright Law Revision Study
No. 22 (Comm. Print 1956), in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1009-15 (1963).
2. Three states enacted fixed damages legislation in 1783. The Massachusetts statute
provided for an award of damages of a sum not to exceed 3,000 pounds, but not less than
five pounds. Legislation adopted in New Hampshire and Rhode Island provided that
damages were not to exceed 1,000 pounds or be less than five pounds. See infra notes
22-24 and accompanying text. See also Patry, The Right to a Jury in Copyright Cases, 29
J. COPYRIGHT SOCY 139, 150 (1981).
3. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1947).
4. Id. Section 2 of the Act provided, in relevant part:
[11f any other person or persons ... shall print, reprint, publish, or import...
any copy or copies of such map, chart, book or books, without the consent of the
author or proprietor thereof ... then such offender or offenders shall... forfeit
and pay the sum of fifty cents for every infringing sheet which shall be found
in his or their possession, . .. the one moiety thereof to the author or proprietor
of such map, chart, book or books who shall sue for same, and the other moiety
thereof to and for the use of the United States, to be recovered by an action of
debt ....
Id. § 2. This section applied only to works that had been previously published.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). Statutory damages were derived from the
following language of the provision: "[I]n lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just... and such damages shall in no other case
exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded as a
penalty." Id. Because of the language of the statute, statutory damages were often
referred to as "in lieu" damages. See e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 1977).
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("the 1909 Act"),6 the predecessor to the current act, 7 was the

source of conflicting decisions and often the subject of heated
controversy.8
Judicial uncertainty centered primarily around when statutory
damages were available as a remedy for copyright infringement
and how to measure the award. 9 Conflicts also arose over
whether statutory damages should be awarded in cases of innocent infringement, 10 and whether statutory damages were to be
assessed by judge or jury." Attempts at legislative revision were
largely unsuccessful 12 until Congress passed the current act, the
13
Copyright Act of 1976 ("the 1976 Act").
The 1976 Act substantially revised the statutory damages
clause of the 1909 Act, thereby resolving many of the existing
conflicts. 14 Despite this legislative reform, judicial uncertainty
still surrounds the award of statutory damages, 15 giving rise to
the inconsistent application of the statute. Because statutory
damages may be the only monetary relief available to copyright

6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976) (repealed 1978).
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
8. The controversy centered around the mandatory assessment of the $250 minimum
damages award against innocent infringers of copyrights. Users of copyrighted material
contended that the $250 minimum was too harsh a remedy for those who did not know
that they were infringing. Copyright owners, on the other hand, insisted that the minimum amount was necessary to prevent inroads upon the copyright owner's rights. See
generally Caplan, The Measure of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of Copyright,
37 MICH. L. REv. 564 (1939). See also infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
9. Brown, The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An
Explanatory Study, Copyright Law Revision Study No. 23 (Comm. Print 1958), in 2
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1067, 1085-86 (1963). The statutory damages provision included
minimum arbitrary amounts for each infringement, which the courts could award in
their discretion. The suggested amounts depended on the nature of the infringement and
the type of copyright infringed. Judicial confusion arose over whether these discretionary
amounts were to be applied in cases involving multiple infringements. Strauss, supra
note 1, at 1007-08. See also Jewell-LaSalle Realty v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931). See infra
note 42 for the schedule of the minimum arbitrary amounts.
10. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the lia-

bility of innocent infringers, see Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent Infringers of
Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision Study No. 25 (Comm. Print 1958), in 2 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 1045-66 (1963).

11. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 85-87 for the various unenacted bills.
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
14. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 14.04(B)-14.04(t) (1983);
Libott, Remedies in Copyright Cases, 8 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 103 (1980). See also infra notes
125-36 and accompanying text.

15. See infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
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owners16 , a consistent approach to damages awards should be
adopted by federal courts.
This note will first trace the history and development of statutory damages as a remedy for copyright infringement. It will
then examine the difficulties the courts had in applying the statutory damages provision of the 1909 Act. The 1976 amendments
will then be analyzed, and the problems eliminated by the current legislation will be discussed. Next, the problems engendered
by the current judicial application of the statutory damages provision are examined. Finally, this note will make specific recommendations to effectuate a uniform approach to the award of
statutory damages.
BACKGROUND

History of the Statutory Damages Provision
The first law to protect the rights of authors in their works was
the English Statute of Anne,1 7 enacted in 1710. This statute
granted an author the exclusive right to print books for fourteen
years from the date of publication, with the right to renew for
another fourteen years thereafter if the author was still alive.'
Damages for violation of the statute were set at one penny per
infringing sheet, one half to the Crown and the other half to the
plaintiff. The purpose of this statutory damages provision was

16. The other types of monetary relief, actual damages and the infringer's profits, are

often conjectural and may be impossible or prohibitively expensive to prove. A copyright
owner must therefore seek statutory damages in order to receive adequate compensation
for his injury.
17. 8 Anne c.19 (1710) was titled "An act for the encouragement of learning by vesting
the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies during the times
therein mentioned." Prior to the Statute of Anne, copyright laws existed, but these were
designed to check the spread of the Protestant Reformation, not to promote learning. In
1556, the King of England exercised unlimited authority over the press by granting a
monopoly of all printing to the Stationers' Co., which was made up of the leading publishers in London. Printing was subject to the orders of the Star Chamber, and all published works had to be entered in the register of the Stationers' Co. The company was
given the powers to search for and confiscate any books not printed by the company, and
infringers were imprisoned by the Star Chamber. The Star Chamber was abolished in
1640, and the powers of the Stationers' Co. revoked. The orders of the Star Chamber were
replaced by various ordinances and licensing acts which prohibited the printing of books
without the author's permission. See CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 5-6 (1973); Patry, supra note 2, at

145-46.
18. 8 Anne c.19 (1710).
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twofold: first, to insure adequate compensation to the plaintiff,
because actual damages were difficult to ascertain and prove; 19
and, second, to deter future infringement. 20 Although the remedy
was created by statute, it was considered to be a remedy at law
21
recoverable by an action of debt.
The need for copyright laws in the United States was acknowledged in 1783, when the Continental Congress passed a resolution recommending that the several states secure to authors and
publishers copyright protection. 22 Every state except Delaware
responded to this recommendation. 23 Most of the statutes were
patterned after the Statute of Anne and provided for fixed damage rates. 24 Three states, however, enacted legislation fixing a
minimum and maximum amount of recovery similar to the lim25
itations found in the current act.
The first federal copyright act was passed by Congress in
1790,26 pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Constitution. 27 The federal act, also patterned after the Statute of Anne,
prescribed a fixed damage rate for the unauthorized publication
of previously published works. 28 Each infringer was required to
pay fifty cents per sheet, half of which went to the copyright

19. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrows 2303, 2350, 98 Eng. Rep. 201,227 (K.B. 1769)
("This Act was brought in... not from any doubt or distrust of a just and legal property
in the works or copyright... but upon the common-law remedy being inadequate, and
the proofs difficult, to ascertain the damage really suffered by the injurious multiplication
of the copies of those books ... ").
20. This purpose is inferred from the Supreme Court's statement in F.W. Woolworth
Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952): "The statutory rule, formulated after
long experience, not merely compels restitution of profit and reparation for injury but
also is designed to discourage wrongful conduct. The discretion of the court is wide
enough to permit a resort to statutory damages for such purposes." Id. at 233.
21. 4 Burrows at 2380-81, 98 Eng. Rep. at 243. See also Patry, supranote 2, at 147-48.
22. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, "LAws PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT," 140 COPYRIGHT OFFICE BuLL No. 3 (Rev. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS].

23. Id. at 1-21.
24. For a summary of the various state copyright laws see Patry, supranote 2, at 150.
See also COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 22, at 1-21.
25. See supra note 2. The current act provides for minimum and maximum damages
of $250 to $10,000. See infra note 120 for the text of the current statutory damages
provision.
26. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1947).
27.

U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8, provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall have

Power... to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by Securing for Limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the Exclusive Right to Their Respective Writings and
Discoveries."
28. See supra note 4 for the text of this provision.
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owner, the other half accruing to the federal government. Damages for infringement of public works were to be recovered at law
by an action of debt.2 9 The purpose of these federal statutory
damages was the same as that of the Statute of Anne: to compensate the copyright owner where actual damages or profits
were difficult or impossible to prove, and to deter future in30
fringement.
The provisions of the original federal copyright act remained
intact until the 1909 Act, although several new provisions were
added during the 1800's. Most of these provisions extended copyright protection to other works, such as engravings, 31 musical
compositions, 32 dramatic works, 33 and paintings. 34 Pursuant to
the Supplemental Copyright Act of 1819, 35 federal courts were

granted original federal subject matter and equity jurisdiction
over copyright cases. 36 The equitable power of the courts was

29. Patry, supranote 2, at 156.
30. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207 (1935). See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899); Peter Pan
Fabrics v. Jobela Fabrics, 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1964); Register of Copyrights, Report on
the General Revision of the Copyright Laws 102 (1961), in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1199,
1302 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Register's Report].
31. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (repealed 1947). The act extended copyright protection to designs, engravings, and prints, and provided for damages of $1 for
every infringing print, one half to accrue to the plaintiff and the other half to the United
States.
32. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1947).
33. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1947).
The act extended copyright protection to the performance of dramatic compositions. An
infringer could be liable for damages in a sam not less than $100 for the first performance and $50 for every subsequent performance. The award of damages under the statutory limits was within the court's discretion.
34. Act of July 8,1870,41st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1947). This
act extended protection to paintings, photographs, and statues, and provided that an
infringer would be required to forfeit $10 for every copy, one half to accrue to the plaintiff
and the other half to the United States.
35. Act of Feb. 15, 1819, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (repealed 1947).
36. The Supplemental Copyright Act provided in part:
That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognisance, [sic]
as well in equity as at law, of all actions, suits, controversies, and cases, arising
under any law of the United States, granting or confirming to authors... the
exclusive right to their respective writings .... and upon any bill in equity....
shall have authority to grant injunctions, ... to prevent the violation of the
rights of any authors ....
Id. Prior to the Copyright Act of 1819, district courts had original jurisdiction over admiralty cases and some lesser civil and criminal matters, but not copyright matters. Jurisdiction for copyright cases rested upon diversity of citizenship where the matter in controversy exceeded $500. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). See also 7B J.
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limited, however, to the issuance of injunctions. Actions to re37
cover statutory damages remained at law.

Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act of 1909
The Copyright Act of 1909 was the first major revision of the
federal copyright laws.3 8 Although the civil remedies provisions

underwent a major revision,3 9 the statutory damages clause
found in section 25 of the Act was essentially a restatement of
existing law. 40 The provision allowed a court to award damages,

in lieu of actual damages and profits, in an amount which
appeared to the court to be just, but within the mandatory limits
of not less than $250 nor more than $5,000 for each in41
fringement.
The legislation set forth an elaborate system of minimum dollar amounts which courts could use as a discretionary guide in
assessing the amount of statutory damages to be awarded within
the mandated limits. For example, a copyright owner could recover a minimum award of one dollar for every infringing copy
of a book.42 These yardstick measurements applied to the number
of copies "made or sold by or found in the possession of the
MooRE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 5-1 (2d ed. 1983).
37. In Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447 (1854), the Supreme Court stated:
"There is nothing in this act of 1819, which extends the equity powers of the courts to the
adjudication of forfeitures; it being manifestly intended, that the jurisdiction therein conferred should be the usual and known jurisdiction exercised by courts of equity for the
protection of analogous rights." Id. at 455. See also Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899),
wherein the plaintiff brought an action at law to recover damages for the infringement of
his copyrighted play, following a suit in equity to have the defendant enjoined from infringing the copyrighted play. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's award of
statutory damages.
38. See generally H.R. REP. No. 2222,60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1909).
39. The 1909 Act consolidated the damages provisions from all prior copyright acts
into one section, section 25 (later section 101). Prior to the 1909 Act, statutory damages
were both remedial and penal in nature in that half of the damages award went to the
plaintiff and the other half went to the United States. The 1909 Act eliminated the forfeiture of the award to the United States, thus making the damages provisions clearly
remedial.The 1909 Act further provided that a plaintiff could recover an infringer's profits in damage actions. See generally H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1909).
40. Id. The only -new provision added was a section giving copyright protection to
lectures and sermons.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
42. Id. The yardstick measurements applied only within the $250-5,000 range and
prescribed the following awards: $10 for every infringing copy of a painting, statue, or
sculpture, and $1 for every infringing copy of any other copyrighted work; $50 for every
infringing delivery of a lecture, sermon, or address; $100 for the first and $50 for every
subsequent performance of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or orchestral composition;
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infringer or his agents or employees." 43 The statute further provided for special monetary limits in cases of newspaper reproductions or photographs and infringements of nondramatic
works by means of motion pictures. 44 The maximum limitation
of $5,000 did not apply in cases where infringements occurred
after the defendant had been served with notice of the existence
45
of the copyright.
The proliferation of copyright infringement suits gave rise to
numerous problems regarding the interpretation and application
of this broadly drafted provision. It soon became apparent that
judicial uncertainty and inconsistencies surrounded the award of
damages under the 1909 Act.
When Statutory Damages Could Be Awarded
Since the mandatory minimum and maximum limitations
46
applied in all cases where statutory damages were awarded, it
was necessary for a court to determine when statutory damages
were applicable. Some courts held that statutory damages were
not recoverable where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an
injury resulting from the infringement. 47 These courts reasoned
that the purpose of statutory damages was to compensate the
copyright owner who established the fact of injury but could not

and $10 for every performance of any other musical composition. For a discussion of how
these yardstick measurements were applied, see 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, at Appendix
17.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
44. Id. The special limits for newspaper reproductions of photographs were $50-200,
and for a nondramatic or undramatized work innocently infringed by a motion picture,
the damages could not exceed $100.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). The notice provision stated that "the
limitation as to the amount of recovery [shall not] apply to infringements occurring after
the actual notice to a defendant, either by service of process in a suit or other written
notice served upon him." Id. Courts were not required to award more than $5,000 where
the defendant received actual notice, and cases awarding more than the maximum were
rare. See Brown, supra note 9, at 1083-86.
46. Jewell-LaSalle Realty v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931).
47. See, e.g., Washingtonian Publishing v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(statutory damages not awarded where no damage to plaintiff and no profits to defendant printer); F.A. Mills, Inc. v. Standard Music Roll Co., 223 F. 849 (D.N.J. 1915), aff'd,
241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917) (nominal damages of six cents awarded where no actual damage
to plaintiff and no profits to defendant); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bleeker, 224 F. Supp.
595 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (statutory damages not awarded where existence of damages and
profits not proved).
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prove the amount of damages. 48 Other courts took a contrary
view, holding that minimum damages were mandatory, even
though the existence of actual damages was not established by
49
the plaintiff.
An even greater conflict existed over whether statutory damages could be awarded when actual damages or profits were
ascertainable. Based on an early Supreme Court case,50 several
courts held that statutory damages could not be awarded if
either actual damages or profits were proved, even though the
amount of actual damages or profits was negligible.51 Thus,
courts had no discretion to award statutory damages where a
lesser amount of actual damages or profits could be ascertained
and proved. This practice was severely restricted by the United
States Supreme Court in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary
Arts, Inc. 52 In this case, the Court held that statutory damages
could be awarded, even though there was evidence of the infringer's profits. The Court reasoned that a trial court was vested
with broad discretion to determine whether it was more just to

48.

In Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192 F. 67 (D. Minn. 1912), the court stated:
[I]t cannot be possible that, where the court is of the opinion that there were no
damages at all, it still is bound to allow $250, and that, where the court is of the
opinion that it would be a matter of injustice to allow even $1, it would be
compelled by law to allow $250. Some other construction must be given to that
provision. I think it means that where the court is satisfied that there are substantial damages, but the evidence is incomplete or is insufficient, so that the
court cannot determine just what the damages are, then it may allow them on
that basis. But wherever the court is of the opinion that the damages cannot be
more than $50 or $100, it should not allow $250.
Id. at 71. In Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, the court held that because there
were neither damages to the plaintiff nor profits to the defendant printer, to impose statutory damages on the printer would amount to a penalty. 140 F.2d at 466.
49. See, e.g., Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (no actual
damages, but $250 awarded); Quackenbush Music, Ltd. v. Wood, 381 F. Supp. 904, 906
(M.D. Tenn. 1974) (no specific damages proved, but $250 awarded for each cause of
action); Manpower, Inc. v. Temporary Help of Harrisburg, 246 F. Supp. 788, 791 (E.D. Pa.
1965) (no actual damages or profits, but one dollar per copy for 3,000 copies awarded).
50. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
51. The .Court in Sheldon stated, "We agree with petitioners that the in lieu clause is
not applicable here, as the profits have been proved and the only question is as to their
apportionment." Id. at 399. Cases relying on the language in Sheldon include Washingtonian Publishing v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Malsed v. Marshall Field
& Co., 96 F. Supp. 372, 376 (W.D. Wash. 1951). See also Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd
Corp., 162 F.2d 354,378 (9th Cir. 1947); Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F.2d
567, 568-70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 572 (1938); Atlantic Monthly v. Post Publishing, 27 F.2d 556,560 (D. Mass. 1928).
52. 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
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allow a recovery based on proven damages or one estimated
53
within the statutory scheme.
By leaving the matter to the discretion of the court, the Woolworth decision appeared to settle the question of when statutory
damages could be awarded. Judicial uncertainty nevertheless
continued.
54
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Woolworth case to hold that a
trial court had discretion to choose between actual damages and
profits or statutory damages where both actual damages and
profits had been proved. Statutory damages were, however, mandatory if either damages or profits could not be proved. 55 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the rule that a
plaintiff could recover both the infringer's profits and statutory
damages when actual damages could not be calculated. 56 The
court reasoned that since the statute conferred broad discretion
on the courts, both statutory damages and profits were recoverable by the copyright owner. 57 Due to these varying interpretations, the measure of a plaintiffs recovery turned largely upon
where the copyright action was brought.
Statutory Damages in Multiple Infringement Cases
The mandatory minimum and maximum limitations of $250
58
and $5,000, respectively, applied to each separate infringement.
Thus, an important consideration in awarding statutory damages was the number of infringements involved in the action.
Although technically each infringing copy or performance constituted a separate infringement of a copyright, the courts generally did not construe the statutory damages provision as requiring a separate minimum damages award of $250 for each copy

53. The Court stated that "[w]e § sound exercise of judicial discretion to determine
whether on all the facts a recovery upon proven profits and damages or one estimated
within the statutory limit is more just." Id. at 234.
54. 367 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1966).
55. Id. at 240.
56. Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978);
Peter Pan Fabrics v. Jobela Fabrics, 329 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1964).
57. Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust, 592 F.2d at 657.
58. L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing, 249 U.S. 100, 106 (1919). See also
Comment, Monetary Recovery Under the Copyright,Patent and Trademark Acts, 45 TEx.
L. REV. 953, 966 (1967).
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or performance.5 9 Rather, if multiple copies were made of a single copyrighted work, then only one copyright was considered
infringed for purposes of applying the minimum or maximum
damages award. 60 For example, if 1,000 copies of a single copy-

righted book were made, there would be only one infringement
subject to the damages award. On the other hand, if several different copyrighted works had been infringed, then the legislative remedy would apply to each work infringed. 61 In cases
involving a related series of infringing events, it was not always
clear whether the series of events constituted one infringement
or several, even though only one copyright may have been
62
involved.

L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing63 was the first
Supreme Court case to construe the statutory damages provision.
In this case, the Court held that where the same copyrighted
work appeared as an advertisement in two different days' editions of defendant's newspaper, two separate infringements had
occurred, giving rise to two separate claims for minimum dam-

59. The Copyright Act provided suggested minimum amounts to be awarded for each
infringing copy or performance. These minimum amounts, or yardstick measurements,
are discussed supra note 42 and accompanying text. If a minimum damages award of
$250 were required for each infringing copy or performance, the yardstick measurements
would have no meaning. See Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
60. Jewell-LaSalle Realty v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931) (court held minimum of $250
must be awarded when fewer than 25 infringing performances of a single copyrighted
woik were given); L.A. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing, 249 U.S. 100 (1919) (several
copies of each of six works constituted one act of infringement for each work published);
Greenfield v. Tanzer, 186 F. Supp. 795 (D. Mass. 1960) (one dollar per copy awarded). See
also Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (several
performances of one work constituted one act of infringement).
61. Westermann Co., 249 U.S. at 105 (printing of six copyrighted illustrations constituted at least six infringements); Robert Stigwood Group v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1103
(2nd Cir. 1976) (court held each performance of rock opera infringed four copyrights);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Log Cabin Club, 365 F. Supp. 325, 328 (N.D. W.Va. 1973)
(performance of three songs gave rise to three copyright infringements).
62.- For example, the continuous run of an infringing play constituted a related series
of infringing events. It was not always clear whether each performance of the play constituted a separate infringment giving rise to separate statutory damages awards, or
whether the entire run constituted one infringement. Compare Select Theatres v. Ronzoni
Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (infringing play presented over
radio in 20 installments constituted 20 infringements) with MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d
180, 187 (2d Cir. 1981) (infringing play performed once a week for 130 weeks constituted
one infringement).
63. 249 U.S. 100 (1919).
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ages.6 4 The Court found that the two awards were justified because different advertisers sponsored each publication. 65 Two
later cases, citing Westermann as authority, held that each succeeding publication of a single copyrighted work constituted a
separate infringement for purposes of awarding minimum damages. 66 Other courts, however, grouped all the publications to67
gether into a single act of infringement.
An even greater problem existed in cases involving infringement of musical or dramatic works in network broadcasts. If a
simultaneous broadcast of an infringing performance over several different network stations constituted a separate infringement for each station outlet, a defendant could be liable for substantial statutory damages. Such a situation occurred in Law v.
National BroadcastingCo., 68 in which the court held that NBC's
broadcast of plaintiffs composition on three separate occasions,
with chain hookups of sixty-seven, sixty-six, and eighty-five stations, constituted a total of 218 infringing performances. 69 In
Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 70 however, the court
rejected such an approach and held that a simultaneous television broadcast over 162 different network stations constituted a
single act of infringement for purposes of awarding statutory
71
damages.

64. Id. at 105. The case actually involved six different copyrighted illustrations. Five
of the illustrations were published once, and the other illustrations published twice. The
court determined that each of the six copyrights was infringed and that each publication
constituted a separate infringement, making a total of seven infringements. Id.
65. The Court reasoned that each advertiser was an independent infringer and that
by publishing the advertisements, the defendant participated in the advertisers' independent infringements. Id. at 105.
66. Burndy Eng'g v. Sheldon Serv. Corp., 39 F. Supp. 274, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (each
complete printing treated as separate infringement) Zuckerman v. Dickson, 35 F. Supp.
903, 904 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (five publications constituted one act of infringement). See also
Journal of Commerce v. Boston Transcript Co., 292 F. 311, 313 (D. Mass. 1923) (publication in one issue of defendant's paper of several different passages from one issue of
plaintiffs paper constituted one act of infringement).
67. Doll v. Libin, 17 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D. Mont. 1936) (multiple publications constituted a single act of infringement).
68. 51 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
69. The court awarded $10 for each of the 218 infringing performances, for a total of
$2,180. Id. at 799.
70. 249 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
71. Id. at 342-43. The court awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in statutory damages. Pursuant to the statute, the defendant's willful infringement removed the $5,000 maximum
limitation. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). The $25,000 awarded exceeded the
amount that would have been awarded if the yardstick measurement of $50 per infringing performance had been applied to each station's broadcast. See supra note 42.
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The courts adopted two tests to determine the number of infringing acts: the "time test" and the "heterogeneity test."72
Courts using the "time test" looked to the length of time separating each publication or performance.7 3 Generally, when the interval between repeated infringements was a matter of days, courts
treated the infringements as one continuing violation, justifying
a single minimum damages award.74 Where the interval between
infringements was substantially longer, courts viewed the infringements as multiple infringements, with each infringement
giving rise to a claim for at least minimum statutory damages.7 5
Thus, the amount of damages awarded pursuant to the statute
could turn simply on the number of days separating each publication or performance.
Courts adopting the "heterogeneity test" looked at the business circumstances surrounding the repeated infringements.7 6
Under this approach, many factors, such as differences between
advertisers, financial arrangements, audiences, or locations, were
analyzed. The courts then determined whether the circumstances
were so similar that the infringements should be treated as one
continuous statutory violation or so different that they should be
77
treated as multiple infringements.

72. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.04[E]. See e.g., Robert Stigwood Group v.
O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir., 1976) ("Another test would be whether each infringement claimed is a separate transaction, perhaps involving different tortfeasors ....
We take the rule to be that when the components of the infringing activity are heterogeneous, the presumption is that each infringing activity is a separate infringement.");
Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Co., 475 F. Supp. 78, 81-8
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("In determining the number of times a defendant has infringed upon
protected work, common sense provides the surest guide. In close cases, this circuit has
also used the 'time test' ... and the 'heterogenity' test...").
73. See Robert Stigwood Group, 530 F.2d at 1102-03; Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., 475 F. Supp. at 82.
74. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 187 (2nd Cir. 1981) (continuous run of show
constituted one infringement); Doll v. Libin, 17 F. Supp. 546 (D. Mont. 1936) (publications
on April 17, 19, 22, and 24, and May 5). But see Advertisers Exch. v. Bayless Drug Store,
50 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1943) (publications on April 2 and 3 constituted separate
infringements).
75. Baccaro v. Pisa, 252 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (six radio broadcasts, one each
month during the period of October 1961 to March 1962 constituted six separate infringements); Zuckerman v. Dickson,'35 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (publications on Oct. 24
and 31 and Nov. 7, 14, and 21 gave rise to five damages awards).
76. See e.g., Robert Stigwood Group, 530 F.2d at 1103; Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., 475 F. Supp. at 82.
77. See Westermann Co., 249 U.S. at 105 (two advertisements sponsored by two different advertisers constituted two separate infringements); Robert Stigwood Group, 530 F.2d
at 1103 (separate sponsors and locations constituted separate infringing performances);
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Although application of these tests resulted in more uniform
decisions, the tests were not a complete answer to the problem of
determining the number of infringements. Judicial confusion
still existed because the length of the interval and the degree of
heterogeneity necessary to constitute separate infringements were
78
not always clearly defined.
Criticism of the Mandatory Minimum Limitation
The mandatory minimum statutory damages award of $250
provoked a great deal of controversy between the copyright
owners and the users of copyrighted material. 79 Criticism of the
minimum damages provision centered on its apparent harshness
when applied to an innocent infringer, particularly when multiple copyrights were infringed, since each infringement constituted a separate statutory award.8 0 Courts were also reluctant to
award the statutory minimum in cases where the infringer failed
to realize any profit and the copyright owner suffered only nom81
inal damages.
Various groups of copyright owners insisted that innocent
infringements were rare.8 2 Copyright proprietors also stressed
that the mandatory minimum award was vitally important

Iowa State Univ. Research Found., 475 F. Supp. at 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (different television
audiences); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 125 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(different clients).
78. A 1960 study published under the auspices of the Register of Copyrights stated
that "[I]t is not clear how many infringements are involved when a copyrighted work...
[i]s used in successive editions or broadcasts, or in simultaneous broadcasts" and that
"[tihere is therefore good reason for some uncertainty about the extent of statutory liability for multiple infringements .... Brown, supra note 9, at 1083-86.
79. The mandatory minimum award was the source of recurrent complaints by copyright users, especially in the area of performing rights. These complaints were voiced
extensively during the 1936 hearings on various bills to amend the minimum damages
award. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. See also Brown, supra note 9, at
1081; Comment, Copyright Reform and the Duffy Bill, 47 YALE L.J. 433 (1938).
80.

Note, Remedies for Copyright Infringement, 23 ARK. L. REV. 464, 470 (1969). See

generally Latman & Tager, supra note 10, at 1045.
81. In Fred Fisher Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), Judge Learned
Hand stated: "As for damages, it seems to me absurd to suggest that [plaintiff] has suffered any injury .... The controversy is a... mere point of honor, of scarcely more than
irritation ....

However, section 25 [section 101(b)]... fixes a minimum of $250, which is

absolute in all cases .... Therefore I must and do award that sum as damages...." Id.
at 152.
82. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, 89th Cong.,

1st Sess. 137 (1965), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
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because it discouraged pirating and provided more than mere
nominal damages where actual damages and profits could not
be proved.8 3 The minimum statutory award was also of particular importance to performing rights societies, such as the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"),
because potential liability for damages in the amount of $250
encouraged users of recorded music to pay the licensing fee
8 4
charged by the societies for the use of such music.
Dissatisfaction with the harshness of the minimum damages
award resulted in the introduction into Congress of several bills
to amend the provision.8 5 Each bill contained provisions for limiting the liability of innocent infringers, either by reducing the
minimum limitation8 6 or by eliminating it altogether. 87 The bills
met strong opposition from copyright owners, however, and none
became law.88 Thus, courts continued to wrestle with the problem of awarding minimum statutory damages to plaintiffs in
cases of innocent infringement.
Judge or Jury Determinationof Amount of Damages
The statutory damages provision of the 1909 Act stated that

(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1965 REVISION BILL].
83. See 1961 Register's Report, supra note 30, at 1303-04.
84. For a discussion of how these performing rights societies operate, see Brown,
supra note 9, at 1078-82. The practices of these societies were critized by Senator Duffy in
Duffy, InternationalCopyright, 8 AIR L. REV. 213, 220-23 (1937).
85. H.R. 10434, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); H.R. 6990, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); H.R.
12549, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) (the "Vestal bills"); H.R. 11420, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936), (the "Sirovich bill"); S. 3047, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (the "Duffy bill"); H.R.
10632, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (the "Daly bill"). See also, Strauss, supra note 1, at
1016-25.
86. Section 14(d) of the 1931 Vestal bill provided that in cases of innocent infringement, a plaintiff could only recover an amount equivalent to the fair and reasonable
value of a license, but not less than $50 nor more than $2,500. H.R. 12549, 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. (1931). The Sirovich bill limited recovery in innocent infringement cases to just
compensation for the use made of the infringed right, with the amount of compensation
to be determined with the aid of expert testimony as to current rates. H.R. 11420, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
87. Section 16(d) of the 1926 and 1930 Vestal bills provided that a plaintiff would not
be entitled to any statutory damages if the defendant proved that his conduct was innocent. H.R. 10434, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); H.R. 6990, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). Section 25 of the Duffy bill eliminated the minimum damages award entirely, providing that
statutory damages would be paid in an amount "not exceeding $20,000... as shall in the
opinion of the court be... just, proper, and adequate, in view of the circumstances of the
case." S. 3047, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 25(a)(3) (1935).
88. The Duffy bill, however, was passed by the Senate on August 7, 1935. S. 3047.
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), 79 CONG. REc. 12615 (1935).
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damages were to be awarded as the court considered just.89 Because the statute was unclear as to what was meant by the use
of the word "court," judicial uncertainty arose over whether the
judge or the jury was to measure the statutory damages award.
The first appellate court case to address the issue, Mail &
Express Co. v. Life Publishing Co.,90 held that the jury could be
directed to award minimum statutory damages if it found for the
plaintiff. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
trial judge could have awarded the minimum damages, but was
not authorized under the statute to direct the jury to do so. The
Second Circuit reasoned that use of the word "court" did not
require the judge to act by himself in assessing minimum damages.9 1 Rather, the statute allowed the judge to direct the jury to
assess the damages within the limitations prescribed by the
92
legislation.
A jury trial was also allowed on the plaintiffs claim for statutory damages in Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe.93 There, the
court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the judge must assess
damages because this remedy was merely incidental to equitable
injunctive relief. The Chappell court determined that under the
common law the plaintiff could have recovered such damages by
an action of debt for which the right to a jury trial clearly
94
existed.
Other courts, however, denied the right to a jury trial,95 finding that the word "court" meant that a judge was to assess the
damages.9 6 Some courts even held that statutory damages were

89. "[I]n lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall
appear to be just...." 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
90. 192 F. 899 (2d Cir. 1912).
91. "[W]e do not think that by use of the word 'court' it is required that the judge
acting by himself shall assess the damages when a case is calling for an award under
the minimum damages clause. We think it the better view that the statute permits him
to direct the jury to assess the damages within the prescribed limits." Id. at 901.
92. Id.
93. 13 F.R.D. 321 (D. Mass. 1952).
94. Id. at 322-23. The court stated that statutory damages could not properly be
considered as merely incidental to injunctive relief because the right to such damages
was provided as a distinct and separate remedy by the statute. See also BMI v. MoorLaw, Inc. 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 (D. Del. 1978) (right to a jury trial); Chappell & Co.,
v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1977) (right to a jury trial).
95. See, e.g., Chappel & Co. v. Palermo Cafe, 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957); Cayman
Music, Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
96. Cayman Music, 403 F. Supp. at 796. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977).
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merely incidental to injunctive relief and hence were equitable in
nature, thus precluding a jury trial on all issues of the case. 7
The fact that decisions in this area could not be reconciled
resulted in inconsistent application of the legislative remedy.
The right to a jury trial in statutory damages copyright cases
thus depended largely upon the jurisdiction in which the case
was brought.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1976 ACT
STATUTORY DAMAGES PROVISION

The conflicting decisions arising from the application of the
statutory damages provision of the 1909 Act and criticism of the
mandatory minimum damages award sparked attempts to revise
the legislation. In 1961, the Register of Copyrights submitted a
report to Congress 98 based on a series of studies concerning the
major substantive issues of copyright revision.9 9 The report contained detailed recommendations to reform the copyright laws,
including substantial changes in the statutory damages provision. 100 The Register's recommendations were incorporated into a
preliminary draft of provisions which were intended to provide
the basis for further discussions on the revision of the copyright
laws. 101

97. Cayman Music, 403 F. Supp. at 796-97; BMI v. Papa John's, 201 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 302 (N.D. Ind. 1979). In Papa John's, the court relied on three factors in holding that statutory damages were equitable in nature. First, the court determined that

by creating a remedy where actual damages were not provable at law, Congress had
simply authorized by statute what equity courts had been doing for some time: "Not to
suffer a wrong to be without a remedy." Second, the court compared statutory damages to the back pay awards under Title VII and found the two to be similar. Since
back pay awards were similar to the equitable relief of restitution, the court reasoned
that, similarly, statutory damages should also be committed to the equitable jurisdiction of the court. Finally, the court turned to the use of the word "court," and determined that since the statute conferred broad discretion on the "court" to determine the
amount, juries were meant to be precluded from deciding the issue. Id.
98. 1961 Register's Report, supra note 30.
99. The series consisted of 35 studies prepared under the supervision of the Copyright Office. These studies are reprinted in 1 & 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT (1963).
100. The Register recommended that the statutory damages provision be clarified
to remove the danger of exorbitant awards in multiple infringement cases. The Register also recommended that the minimum damages award be reduced in cases where
innocent infringement was proved, and that statutory damages be awarded in all
cases where actual damages and profits would be less than $250. The question of
whether a jury should measure the statutory damages award was not addressed. 1961
Register's Report, supra note 30, at 1304-05.
101.

COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
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Following discussions on the preliminary draft in early 1964102
and subsequent debates on a draft bill submitted to Congress for
comment, 10 3 a bill to amend the copyright laws was introduced
in both houses in 1965.104 The statutory damages provision of
the bill allowed the copyright owner to elect statutory damages
instead of actual damages and profits. 0 5 In cases involving
innocent infringement, the bill allowed a court to reduce the minimum damages award to $100, or t eliminate it entirely when
an instructor infringed the copyright.1 0 6 The maximum limitation on damages was increased to $20,000 where the copyright
owner proved willful infringement. 10 7 The bill also included a

(1964), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976). This
draft resolved the question of when statutory damages could be awarded by permitting the copyright owner to recover the greater of either actual damages, infringer's
profits, or statutory damages. In order to clarify the award of statutory damages in
multiple infringement cases, section 38 of the draft provided that one award would be

made for "all infringements of a single work for which the infringer is liable." Id. at
29. A single work was defined as including "all of the material appearing in any one
edition or version of the work used by the infringer." Id. at 29 n.26. A separate clause
was included which allowed a court in its discretion to withhold or reduce statutory
damages if the infringer proved that he was not aware that his acts constituted
infringement. The draft also increased the maximum damages award to $10,000.
102. Transcripts of the discussions on the preliminary draft are found in COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 37-311 (1964) and
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT
FOR REVISED U.S. CCOPYRIGHT LAW 1-242 (1964), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).

103. H.R. 11947,88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H.R. 12354,88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); S.
3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The text of the bill is reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).

104. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The
text of the bill is reprinted in 5 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).

105. This right to elect statutory damages was never contemplated by Congress during the discussions held on the preliminary draft and the bill submitted to Congress for
comment. The transcripts of the discussions on the preliminary draft appear in COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 135-69 (1964), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976); transcripts of the discussions on H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964) appear in COMMIrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS
AND COMMENTS 199, 201-05 (1964), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).

106. The text of H.R. 4347, supra note 104, was amended during the second session of
the 89th Congress to allow the court to remit any statutory damages in infringement
cases involving instructors. See H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1966),
reprinted in 11 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976). In addition to

instructors, the final bill that became the Copyright Act of 1976 allowed the courts to
remit statutory damages in cases involving library and archives copying and infringing
transmissions by public broadcasting entities.
107.

H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1965), reprintedin 11 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
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clause making one damages award payable for all infringements
involved in the action for any one work, for which any one
infringer was liable individually, or for which two or more
08
infringers were liable jointly or severally.1
A supplementary report prepared by the Copyright Office to
accompany the revised bill' 0 9 stated that one of the objectives of
the legislation was to correct the multitude of problems that
arose when awards of minimum statutory damages were applied
to multiple infringement situations. 1 0 The bill allowed for separate awards of statutory damages where separate works were
involved in an action, but an infringed work involving a compilation of several copyrights was to constitute only one work."'
The report stated that only one award would be made for each
work involved, regardless of the number of times it was infringed.1 1 2 In suits where the infringements were committed by
joint tortfeasors, the bill specified that the plaintiff could recover
a single award of statutory damages, for which the tortfeasors
were jointly and severally liable. 13 Where separate infringements
were joined in the same action and the defendants were not
jointly liable, however, separate awards of statutory damages
4
would be appropriate."
Another goal of the revised bill was to satisfy the objections of
copyright owners to the elimination of the mandatory minimum
award, yet reflect concern for the impact of statutory damages
on innocent infringers. 115 The bill provided that the minimum
damages award of $250 would be available in all cases of infringement, butthat a court had discretion to reduce the amount
to $100 where the defendant proved his infringement was
innocent."16
Subsequent copyright revision bills were introduced during the

REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 159 (1976).

108. Id. This amount was later increased to $50,000. See infra note 118. For cases
discussing the willful infringement requirement, see infra note 131.
109.

1965 REVISION BILL, supra note 82.

110. Id. at 136.
111. Id.
112. Id. The report stated that the criterion to be considered was the number of distinct works infringed, not the number of copyrights, exclusive rights, owners, or registrations involved.
113. Id. at 136-37
114. Id.
115. Id.at 137.
116. Id.
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90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, and 94th Congresses, 117 but the statutory
damages provisions of these bills remained substantially the
same as that of the revision bill introduced in 1965.118 Legislation introduced during the 94th Congress was passed by both
houses and signed into law by President Ford on October 19,
1976.119 Section 504(c) of the 1976 Act embodied the new law on
120
statutory damages in copyright infringement cases.
The legislative history of section 504(c) reveals that Congress
sought to clarify when statutory damages could be awarded and
121
how they were to be measured in multiple infringement cases.
Similarly, the legislation seeks to protect innocent infringers
from the harshness of the mandatory minimum award. 22 An

117. For a brief description of the various bills, see S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659; H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 48-50 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & NEWS 5661-63.
118. The maximum limitation of $20,000 was increased to $50,000 in the final bill.
Compare H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965) with H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975)

119. The law was passed by the Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 3841
(1976), the House, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 32015 (1976), and signed into law,
122 CONG. REC. 35087 (1976).
120. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)). Section 504(c), the statutory damages clause, provides:
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner
may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one
infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are
liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $250 or more than $10,000
as the court considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a
composition or derivative work constitute one work.
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and
the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
$50,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $100.
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer
believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the
copyrighted work was a fair use ...
f the infriger was: (i) an employee or
agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library or archives ....

or (ii) a

public broadcasting entity ....
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982).
121. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161, 162 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5777-78. See supra notes 100-01 and 109-14 and accompanying
text.
122. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.

504
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analysis of section 504(c), together with recent case law, reveals
that Congress's major objectives have been met. 123 Application
of the statutory damages provision, 24however, is still plagued
with both new and existing problems.1
One of the most fundamental changes provided by the 1976
Act involving damages is the clause which grants a copyright
owner the right to elect statutory damages instead of actual
damages and profits at any time prior to final judgment. 125 This
right to elect statutory damages is absolute, and therefore does
not depend upon the adequacy of the evidence introduced as to
actual damages and profits, a factor largely determinative of
whether statutory damages could be awarded under the 1909
Act. 26 Furthermore, the House Report, which accompanied the
1976 Act, 27 indicates that the copyright owner may elect to
receive statutory damages even though he has adequate proof of
his actual damages and the infringer's profits, but intentionally
declines to present it. 128 By removing the decision to award statutory damages from the court's discretion, section 504(c) clearly
1909 Act
resolves the judicial uncertainty that existed under the
29
awarded.
be
can
damages
statutory
regarding when

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5778-79. See supra notes 100-01 and 115-16 and accompanying
text.
123. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5777. See infranotes 125-29 and 132-33 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 105. For cases in which the plaintiff elected to receive statutory
damages, see Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 212 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Hospital For Sick
Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1980); George Simon,
Inc. v. Spatz, 492 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Wis. 1980); Doehrer v. Caldwell, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
391 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
126. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Lauratex Textile Corp. v.
Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a case involving infringement of
plaintiffs copyrighted textiled design. There, the court found that the evidence presented
at trial permitted a calculation of defendant's gross profits and therefore an approximate
measure of the plaintiffs damages. The plaintiff, however, had elected to receive statutory damages. After finding the actual damages of $5,177, the court went on to award the
plaintiff $40,000 based on the amount of actual damages and proof of the defendant's
willful infringement.
127. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659.
128. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5777.
129. But see Weave Corp. v. Romitex Jacquard Mills, 2 COPYRIGHTL. REP. (CCH) 25,511
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1983), wherein the court states that section 504(c) allows a court to
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This right to elect statutory damages, even though adequate
proof of actual damages and profits is available, may not comport with one of the underlying purposes of the statutory damages award: to compensate the copyright owner when damages
and profits are difficult to prove. 130 Nevertheless, the approach
is desirable because it encourages a copyright owner to bring an
action to protect his rights in the copyrighted work, thereby
deterring future infringement.' 3 ' It also relieves the copyright
owner of the often difficult burden of proving actual damages
and profits, yet assures recovery of at least some measure of
compensation.
The harshness of the $250 mandatory minimum damages
award is alleviated in the current act by allowing for a reduction.
of the minimum damages award to $100 in cases where innocent
infringement is proved. 132 The clause strikes an equitable belance between the competing interests of the copyright owners
and the users of copyrighted material. On the one hand, the minimum damages award is still available to act as a deterrent
against violations of a copyright owner's rights. Furthermore,

award statutory damages in addition to actual damages and profits if the court finds that
the infringement was willful.
130. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
131. Because the minimum statutory damages award is available in all copyright
infringement cases, it operates "as an effective deterrent against numerous small, erosive
violations of a copyright owner's rights." 1965 REVISION Bill, supra note 82, at 137.
Another deterrent against copyright infringement is the possibility of an increased
statutory damages award if the copyright owner proves willful infringement. Section
504(c)(2) provides that statutory damages may be increased up to a maximum of $50,000
in cases where willful infringement is proved. See supra note 120. Several courts have
construed the willfulness requirement as allowing increased statutory damages. See, e.g.,
Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (statutory damages increased to $40,000 where defendant acted with a reckless disregard for
plaintiffs rights); George Simon, Inc. v. Spatz, 492 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (double
statutory damages awarded where defendant knew that plaintiffs songs were copyrighted, yet repeatedly refused to obtain a license to have the songs performed); Hospital For
Sick Children v. Melody Fare, 516 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1980) (increased damages where
defendant knew that copyright existed and failed to obtain a license).
132. At first glance there may not appear to be a great difference between the old
minimum award of $250 and the current minimum award of $100 in cases of innocent
infringment. In actual application of the minimum amount, however, there is a great
difference. For example, a nightclub owner might reasonably believe that the band he
has hired to play in his club has a license to perform copyrighted songs when, in fact, it
does not. If the band plays 10 songs, each infringing a copyright, under the old act the
nightclub owner would have been liable for a minimum of $2,500, 10 copyrights multiplied by $250. Under the 1976 Act, provided he can prove innocent infringement, he will
be liable for $1,000, 10 copyrights multiplied by $100.
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the copyright owner is assured of recovering at least some compensation for his injury. On the other hand, where the defendant
was not aware that he was infringing and had no reason to
believe he was infringing, he will no longer be subject to unwarranted liability.
The reduction in the minumum damages award is also consistent with the underlying policies of the statutory damages provision.13 3 Because the purpose of deterring infringement is not
present as to infringements committed innocently, an award of
statutory damages against an innocent infringer can only be for
the purpose of compensating the copyright owner. By reducing
the minimum damages award to $100, the statute assures that
.an innocent infringer will merely be compensating the copyright
owner for the wrongful taking, and will not be excessively penalized for his innocent activity.
Multiple Infringements
Section 504(c) provides that one statutory damages award is
payable for all infringements involved in the action with respect
to any one work for which a single defendant or two or more
joint tortfeasors are liable. 134 The House Report and the legislative history make clear that in cases involving multiple infringements, only one award is payable for each work, "no matter how
many acts of infringement are involved in the action and regardless of whether the acts were separate, isolated, or occurred in a
related series."'135 The current provision presents a departure
from the approach taken under the 1909 Act, where courts
employed various tests, such as the "time" test and the "heterogeneity" test, to determine the number of infringements involved
in the action, and then awarded separate statutory damages for
each infringement.a 6 Although this departure appears to ease
the court's burden in determining the number of infringements
involved and how damages are to be awarded in multiple infringement cases, the current Act's approach may prove problematic.
133. See supranote 30 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 120. But see Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music, 534 F.
Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), wherein the court allowed separate damages awards to owners
of different rights in the same copyright.
135. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 5778.
136. See supranotes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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There is nothing in section 504(c) to prevent a copyright owner
from bringing separate actions against the same infringer for
separate infringements of the same work. Because each separate
infringement represents a separate cause of action, 137 section
504(c) may well foster a multiplicity of suits by copyright owners
in order to obtain more than one statutory damages award. The
doctrine of res judicata, which prevents a plaintiff from maintaining an action based on a claim that was or should have been
litigated in a prior action, may bar the copyright owner's subsequent actions. 138 Because of judicial inconsistency in defining
what claims should have been litigated in the first action,13 9 the
doctrine thus may not serve to fully prevent future suits by the

137. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.04(E)(2)(b).
138. In Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), the Supreme Court stated:
The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving the same
cause of action .... The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdic-

tion has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties
to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound "not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as
to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose."... But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different cause or demand, the principle of res judicata is applied much more narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined, but
"only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered."
Id. at 597-98. This statement by the court refers to two facets of the doctrine of res judicata. The first facet concerns a judgment that has an important effect on the issues of
law or fact involved in the second suit, or "issue preclusion." The second facet refers to
"claim preclusion" where a claim in a subsequent suit may be barred entirely by a judgment on the merits on the same claim in a previous suit. See generally, Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion:Judgment for the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 357 (1967); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,65 HARV. L. REV. 818 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Res
JudicataDevelopments]. The concept of claim preclusion is the facet of res judicata that
would apply to the copyright owner's subsequent actions, since he is bringing a subsequent suit on which may or may not be the same claim that was adjudicated in the
original suit. It therefore becomes necessary to determine what is meant by the term
"claim" in order to determine whether a subsequent action should be barred. For a thorough discussion of this doctrine, see generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE

ch. 11 (2d ed. 1977).
139. See Res Judicata Developments, supra note 138, at 824-31, for a collection of
cases expressing various views as to the types of claims that will be barred in subsequent
actions. In Vestal, supra note 138, at 361, the author states that a mechanical definition
of claim would seem to be less desirable than one which is derived from public policy
considerations which underlie the doctrine of res judicata/preclusion. The author further
suggests that the purpose of the second suit and the reasonable expectations of the parties might be considered important factors in defining the term "claim." Id.
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proprietor of the copyright. The current view adopted by the
courts is that those claims that include "all rights of the plaintiff
to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part
of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of
140
which the claim arose" should be maintained in a single action.
Since separate copyright infringements may or may not constitute a "series of connected transactions,"''
courts might feel
constrained to apply either or both the "time" and "heterogeneity" tests to determine whether an action is barred by res judicata. The application of these tests, however, led to judicial
inconsistency under the 1909 Act. 4 2 Courts may determine that,
in the interests of judicial economy, a copyright owner should
recover separate awards for each separate infringement of a single copyright in a single action. This approach appears to have
been followed in at least one recent case, 43 despite the fact that
it contradicts the congressional intent that the infringement of
44
one work gives rise to a single award of statutory damages.
In order to resolve this problem, the legislature should amend
section 504(c) to state that with respect to one work, one award
would be payable for all the infringements committed prior to
the time of suit. This revision eliminates the danger of multiple
suits for successive minimum damages awards because all infringements of one work by a single defendant or jointly liable
defendants would have to be litigated in a single action. Although
this approach appears to limit the amount of damages a copyright owner can recover, the range of damages under the statute
is sufficiently broad to enable a court to award the plaintiff a
just remedy.
Trial by Jury
In revising the copyright laws, Congress did not address the
issue of whether an award of statutory damages gives rise to the
right to a jury trial. The legislature did not amend or explain the
use of the word "court" in the statutory provision. 45 Judicial
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
141. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
143. Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288 (D.R.I. 1982) (statutory damages
multiplied by number of times copyright was infringed).
144. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 5678.
145. Id.
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uncertainty still exists concerning whether the judge or jury
should assess the statutory damages award. 1 46 Recent decisions
indicate a trend toward categorizing an award of statutory damages as an equitable remedy, thus denying the right to a jury
trial on all issues when a plaintiff elects to recover statutory
damages. 147 One commentator has suggested that leaving the
awarding of statutory damages to the judge, not the jury, is perhaps the better view. 148 The denial of this constitutional right is
not warranted, however, either by the language of section 504(c)
or by the history and purpose of the statutory damages award.
The history of statutory damages reveals that under the early
federal copyright laws, such damages were recovered by an
49
action of debt, an action exclusively at law, triable by a jury.
Statutory damages were intended to act as a substitute for actual
damages, traditionally a legal remedy, because of the inherent
difficulty in establishing the value of a copyright and determining the amount of injury. 50 In 1819, when equity jurisdiction for
copyright cases was granted to the federal courts, the equitable
powers extended only to the issuance of injunctions, and did not
attach to the awarding of statutory damages. 15 ' The Copyright
Act of 1909 did nothing to change the legal nature of statutory
damages, because the legislative history of the act indicates that
the statutory damages provision was essentially a restatement of
existing law. 5 2 Futhermore, the 1976 Act also failed to change
this provision, and the legal nature of statutory damages appears
to have remained at law. 15 3 There is, therefore, no historical

146. Compare Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (right to a
jury trial) with Glazier v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1982) (court permitted jury to determine only actual, not statutory, damages). The court in Gnossos Music
grounded its decision on an analysis of the seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
147. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1981); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Club 30, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Glazier v. First Media Corp.,
532 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Lion's Den, 2 COPYRIGHT LAW REP.
(CCH) 25,357 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 1982); Rodgers v. Breckenridge Hotels, 512 F. Supp.
1326 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
148. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.04[C].
149. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
153. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5678. See also Patry supra note 2, at 194.
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basis for concluding that statutory damages are an equitable
154
remedy precluding a jury trial.
Although section 504(c) states that the measurement of statutory damages is within the court's discretion, the language cannot be deemed controlling, because "court" may refer to either
judge, singularly, or judge and jury, together. 155 Judicial interpretation of similar federal statutes is that such language gives
rise to the right to a jury trail on the issue of damages. 5 6 Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the copyright
owner's right to elect statutory damages. 57 If a claim for statutory damages precludes a jury trial, then a copyright owner
could deprive the defendant of a trial by jury on other issues in
the case, such as liability, simply by electing statutory damages
prior to trial. Since the statute allows a copyright owner to make

154. The few cases which have held that statutory damages are equitable in nature
failed to consider the historical background of the statutory damages provision. In Twentieth Century Music v. Frith, 645 F2d 6 (5th Cir. 1981), the court merely stated that the
whole suit before it, in which the plaintiffs had sought an injunction and minimum damages, was equitable in nature. In Rogers v. Breckenridge Hotels Corp., 512 F. Supp. 1326,
1327 (E.D. Mo. 1981), the court relied on the language of the provision in reasoning that
"the court in its discretion" suggested that statutory damages were a form of equitable
relief. The court in Glazier v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1982), relied only
on the legislative history of the current act, which never addressed the jury trial issue.
The one case to examine the history of statutory damages, Broadcast Music v. Papa
John's, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302 (N.D. Ind. 1979), found the history to be inconclusive, and
held that an action for statutory damages was analagous to a common law action on the
case.

155. Accord Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc. 577 F.2d
216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978. See also the Massachusetts ratification
debates on the adoption of the United States Constitution in 2 THE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

(J. Elliott ed.

1891), wherein is stated:
The word court does not, either by a popular or technical construction, exclude
the use of a jury to try facts. When people in common language, talk of a trial at
the Court of Common Pleas, or the Supreme Judicial Court,do they not include
all branches and members of such court-the jurors as well as the judges? They
certainly do, whether they mention the jurors expressly or not.
Id. at 113 (emphasis in original).
156. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Supreme Court examined the damages provision of the fair housing provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612 (1976), which read, "The court may grant relief, as it deems appropriate." The
Court held that Congress meant that the damages should be determined by a jury. In
Barber v. Kimbrells' Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978), the
court similarly interpreted the statutory damages provision of the Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976), which provided that such damages were to be in such
amount "as the court may allow."
157. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
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his election at any time prior to judgment, the owner can determine which issues, if any, will be tried by a jury, by varying the
time at which he makes his election. Surely such a result could
not have been intended by Congress.
Because of the continuing conflict among the circuits in this
area, the Supreme Court should consider granting certiorari
should an appropriate case arise to settle this important issue.
An analysis of the 1976 Act as well as the history and purpose of
the statutory damages award warrants the finding that the
remedy is legal in nature and entitles the litigants to the right to
a trial by jury.
CONCLUSION

Uniform application of the remedy of statutory damages in
copyright infringement cases is essential to copyright owners
because it may be the only monetary remedy available to them.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, the application of the statutory
damages provision was far from uniform, resulting in conflicting
decisions and judicial confusion. Several of the statutory damages problems that arose under judicial application of the 1909
Act have been resolved by the 1976 Act.
The issue of when statutory damages can be awarded is
resolved under the 1976 Act by allowing the plaintiff to elect this
remedy at any time prior to final judgment. The reduction of
minimum damages in innocent infringement cases alleviates the
harshness of the mandatory minimum award. Although the
1976 Act clarified how statutory damages are to be awarded in
multiple infringement cases, legislative amendment will be necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits by copyright owners. Uniform application of the statutory damages provision has not
been achieved, however, because of the failure of the 1976 Act to
address whether an award of statutory damages gives rise to the
right to a jury trial. This omission has resulted in a continuing
conflict among the circuits on the jury trial issue. If given the
opportunity, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to decide
this important question.
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